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Corn: Montejo v. Louisiana and the Impact of Premature Miranda Warnings

MONTEJO V LOUISIANA AND THE IMPACT OF
PREMATURE MIRANDA WARNINGS
Geoffrey S. Corn*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a scenario in which police want to question an indicted
defendant who has been appointed counsel and released from custody.
Two investigators knock on the defendant's door, and the defendant
speaks with them briefly. Following the Supreme Court's suggestion in
Montejo v. Louisiana' the police utilize a standard Miranda warning and
establish that the defendant waives his right to counsel.2 The defendant
responds that he wants to confer with his lawyer before agreeing to
speak with the police. The police scrupulously honor the defendant's
invocation and terminate the interview.' One of the investigators says to
the defendant as he departs, "I'll swing by tomorrow to see if you are
ready to talk." The defendant says nothing other than "goodbye." The
investigator returns the next day and once again begins the meeting by
reading a Miranda warning, even though the defendant is not in custody.
This time, the defendant signs a Miranda waiver. During the second
conversation, the defendant confesses.
Is the confession admissible to prove the defendant's guilt, or is it
barred because of the defendant's unapproachability at the time of the

* Vinson & Elkins Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law Houston; Lieutenant
Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), and formerly Special Assistant for Law of War Matters and Chief of
the Law of War Branch, Office of the Judge Advocate General, United States Army; Chief of
International Law for U.S. Army Europe; Professor of International and National Security Law at
the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's School. A special note of thanks to my research assistant,
Kyle Moore, South Texas College of Law Houston.
1. 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009).
2. See id. ("[W]hen a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to have
counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that typically does the trick
[of waiving the right to counsel], even though the Miranda rights purportedly have their source in
the Fifth Amendment. . . .").
3. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (imposing prophylactic warning
and waiver requirements to ensure defendants are apprised of their "right of silence and to assure
that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored").
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second waiver pursuant to the Edwards-Minnick line of cases?' Put
another way, did the defendant's indication that he wanted to consult
with his counsel when police used a Miranda warning to secure a waiver
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel trigger the Miranda-based
unapproachability rule? Or were police free to reinitiate additional
attempts to secure a waiver even after they used a Miranda warning and
the defendant appeared to invoke?
In Montejo v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel did not prohibit police from initiating
interrogation with a defendant represented by counsel.' In so doing, the
Court upset its prior decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin in which it held the
Sixth Amendment protection functioned identically to the
Miranda-based Edwards-Minnick rule barring reinitiation of
interrogation once a defendant is represented by counsel.'
Central to the Court's decision to reverse course was the
requirement that police obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as a precondition to engaging in
interrogation.' And, as the Montejo Court noted, other protections, most
notably those provided by Miranda v. Arizona8 and its progeny, were
sufficient to protect the defendant from police badgering.' Those
protections already require a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation
to be advised of his right to assistance of counsel during interrogation,
and proof of a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right, for any
statement to be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.1 o For the
Montejo majority, this express notice and waiver was sufficient to
demonstrate a waiver of both the Miranda right to counsel and, where
applicable, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel."
But how should police establish waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in situations where the Miranda right to counsel is
4. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1990) (holding that any waiver of the
right to counsel is ineffective following the accused's invocation, even after consultation with
counsel, describing unapproachability as a "systemic assurance[] that the coercive pressures of
custody were not the inducing cause" of admissions or waivers); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484-85 (1981) (holding that, following invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, an accused "is
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him");
see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986) (holding that "if police initiate interrogation
after a defendant's assertion, at an arraignment or similar proceeding, of his right to counsel, any
waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid"),
overruled by Montejo, 556 U.S. at 797.
5. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95, 797.
6. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
7. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786.
8. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95.
10. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 150-51 (1990) (synthesizing the substance of
Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny).
11. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95.
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inapplicable-situations where police seek to initiate interrogation with
a defendant represented by counsel who is not in custody? In Montejo,
the Court suggested that a Miranda warning and waiver "typically does
the trick" to prove the required Sixth Amendment waiver.12 Was the
Court indicating that police should use a Miranda warning and waiver in
such situations in order to prove waiver of the distinct Sixth Amendment
right? If so, or if police instinctively rely on Miranda warnings in such
situations, it raises an interesting question: would an invocation of the
right to counsel in response to such a Miranda warning be given full
effect even if that warning was not required pursuant to Miranda? In
other words, if police use a Miranda warning and waiver in a
non-custodial situation, will invocation by the suspect be treated
identically to invocation of Miranda rights by a suspect in custody?
The significance of this question is not necessarily related to the
immediate result of an interrogation. If police were to provide a Miranda
warning in a non-custodial situation to a defendant protected by the
Sixth Amendment, questioning following invocation would certainly
violate that protection. But uncertainty arises if police seek to reinitiate
the process with the defendant at a subsequent date. Pursuant to
Montejo, such reinitiation is not prohibited.13 However, if police obtain a
waiver after such reinitiation, could the defendant assert a violation of
the Miranda right to counsel based on the prior invocation of that right
even in a non-custodial context?
Accordingly, this Article will consider the consequence of a
preemptive invocation of Miranda rights in response to a warning issued
in a non-custodial context.14 Such warnings may actually be more
common than the situation implicated by the Montejo decision, made by
police officers uncertain as to the nature of an encounter but seeking to
ensure any statement made by a suspect will be immune from a
Miranda-basedadmissibility challenge. Of course, when officers issue a
Miranda warning in a non-custodial situation, they do so with the
expectation of waiver." But what happens when a suspect
unambiguously invokes one or both of the Miranda rights?
12. Id. at 786.
13. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
14. See supra Part I.
15. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation:A Self-Report Survey of
Police Practicesand Beliefs, 31 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 381, 385, 389 (2007) (reporting eighty-one
percent as an average estimate of the number of "people in general" who waive their Miranda
rights, according to survey of 612 investigators from multiple agencies); see also Anthony J.
Domanico et al., Overcoming Miranda: A Content Analysis of the Miranda Portion of Police
Interrogations,49 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 11-13 (2012) (reporting that ninety-three percent of suspects
[twenty-seven out of a sample size of twenty-nine suspects] waived their Miranda rights during
recorded custodial interrogations involving felony cases in Milwaukee County); cf Mark A.
Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of ContemporaryLaw and Understandings,
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THE MIRANDA RULE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT

'

In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that a statement
obtained from a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation is
considered presumptively coerced and therefore inadmissible (the Court
would later limit inadmissibility to the prosecution's case-in-chief). 6 In
order to rebut this presumption of coercion, the Court held that the
prosecution must establish that the suspect was informed of the so-called
Miranda rights and that the suspect voluntarily waived those rights and
agreed to submit to interrogation." Included among those rights is a
right to have counsel present during questioning-a right to counsel
derived from the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination and distinct from the right to counsel
expressly provided by the Sixth Amendment.s And, according to the
Court, invoking this Miranda right to counsel requires immediate
termination of the questioning.1 9
What the Miranda Court did not address was the impact on
invocation of the Miranda right to counsel on police efforts to elicit a
subsequent Miranda waiver. Would such a waiver be considered valid if
police reinitiated the interrogation and obtained an ostensibly valid
waiver? Or would invocation of the right preclude such reinitiation and
if so, for how long? These questions would be answered by the Court in
three subsequent decisions: Edwards v. Arizona, Minnick v. Mississippi,
and Maryland v. Shatzer.20
In Edwards v. Arizona, police obtained a Miranda waiver from
petitioner, Edwards, who was arrested on a state criminal charge. 2
However, during the interrogation, Edwards indicated he wanted a
lawyer.2 2 In compliance with Miranda, police terminated questioning.2 3

90 MINN. L. REv. 781, 792 & n.54 (2006) (citing multiple articles in support of the notion that
"modem studies demonstrate that roughly eighty percent of suspects waive their Miranda rights and
talk to the police").
16. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966); see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 222, 224-26 (1971) (holding an unmirandized statement admissible for impeachment
purposes); cf Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 715-16, 722-24 (1975) (holding a statement obtained
in disregard of a suspect's invocation of his Miranda right to counsel admissible for impeachment).
17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
18. Id. at 469 (holding that "the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is
indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system we delineate
today").
19. Id. at 444-45; McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177 (1991) (citing Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988)) ("Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for
interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless
counsel is present.").
20. 559 U.S. 98 (2010).
21. Edwards, 451 U.S. at478.
22. Id. at 479.
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The next day, while Edwards was still in custody, he was informed by a
prison guard that police wanted to meet with him.24 Edwards said he did
not want to talk with them but the guard told him he had to. 2 5 When he
met with the officers they once again advised him of his Miranda
rights.2 6 Edwards then waived his rights and made an incriminating
statement. 27
Edwards moved to suppress his confession prior to trial, asserting
that the waiver he made prior to the second interrogation was invalid
because his invocation of the Miranda right to counsel during the first
interrogation barred police from reinitiating questioning. 28 The trial court
denied the motion because police obtained what appeared to be a valid
Miranda waiver prior to the second interrogation. 29 However, the
Supreme Court agreed with Edwards that police reinitiation after
Edwards invoked his Miranda right to counsel was barred, and therefore,
the waiver the police obtained was invalidated by the fact that they
initiated the second interrogation.30
Interestingly, two concurring Justices expressed concern that the
Court seemed to be creating a per se rule that any police reinitiation
following invocation of the Miranda right to counsel automatically
invalidates what may appear to be a valid Miranda waiver.3 For Justices
Powell and Rehnquist, the result was justified because Edwards was
forced to meet with police for the second interrogation, thereby
indicating the waiver was not truly voluntary.32 Their concerns about a
new per se rule were confirmed nine years later when the Court decided
Minnick v. Mississippi. Like Edwards, petitioner Minnick waived his
Miranda rights when first questioned by police, but during the course of
that questioning, invoked his Miranda right to counsel; 33 like Edwards,
police reinitiated questioning after Minnick had been returned to
confinement;34 and like Edwards, Minnick appeared to have waived his
Miranda rights prior to that second interrogation (although according to
the opinion, he refused to sign a written waiver) and made incriminating

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 479-80.
30. Id at 487.
31. See id. at 487-88 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 489-90 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. See id. at 490 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[lit is clear that Edwards was taken from his cell
against his will and subjected to renewed interrogation.... [flt clearly was questioning under
circumstances incompatible with a voluntary waiver of the fundamental right to counsel.").
33. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 148-49 (1990).
34. Id. at 149.
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statements.35 Furthermore, in the two days between the first invocation
and the second waiver, Minnick had consulted his attorney two or three
times. 36

The record suggested Minnick, although refusing to sign a written
Miranda waiver, understood his Miranda right to counsel, understood
how to invoke that right, had consulted with counsel after his first
invocation, and in fact agreed to speak with police without the presence
of counsel after being advised of his Miranda rights at the second
interrogation; nonetheless, the Court applied the Edwards rule to
conclude the waiver was invalid. 37 Importantly, the fact that, like
Edwards, Minnick testified that he was told prior to the second
interrogation that he would "have to talk" to the officer who came to
meet with him and he "could not refuse," 8 appears to have played no
role in the Court's decision. Instead, the per se rule, which Justices
Powell and Rehnquist had rejected in Edwards, was embraced by a
majority of the Court." Accordingly, this Edwards-Minnick rule means
that once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel, police may not
approach the suspect to reinitiate interrogation, even if they obtain a new
Miranda waiver; police reinitiation automatically invalidates any such
waiver. The duration of this "unapproachability" rule was uncertain until
2010 when the Court held in Maryland v. Shatzer that it expires fourteen
days after the suspect returns to his or her normal environment.40
According to the Court, fourteen days is sufficient time for the inherent
coercion of the custodial interrogation to dissipate and to restore a
suspect to a position where he or she may meaningfully exercise the
Miranda rights if provided a subsequent rights warning.41
A.

The Migration of the UnapproachabilityRule to the Realm of the
Sixth Amendment

In 1964, the Supreme Court decided Massiah v. United States 42 and
held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel protected a defendant
from pretrial police questioning, whether overt or covert.43 Massiah
involved police use of an undercover informant wearing a radio

35. Id. at 148-49.
36. Id. at 149 ("Petitioner spoke with the lawyer on two or three occasions, though it is not
clear from the record whether all of these conferences were in person.").
37. Id. at 148-49, 156.
38. Id. at 149.
39. See supranotes 31-32 and accompanying text.
40. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010).
41. Id. at I10-11.
42. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
43. Id. at 205-06.
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transmitter." The Court held that because Massiah, who had already
been indicted, did not make a voluntary and intelligent waiver of his
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel, his statements were
inadmissible. 45 The Court would thereafter clarify that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel (as opposed to the Miranda right to
counsel) applies only after initiation of formal adversarial process and
protects a defendant only in relation to the offense with which he or she
has been charged.
In the subsequent case of Brewer v. Williams," the Court again held
that police violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
when they deliberately elicited a statement from the defendant without
first obtaining a voluntary and intelligent waiver. 47 However, the Brewer
opinion emphasized that "[t]he Court of Appeals did not hold, nor do
we, that under the circumstances of this case Williams could not,
without notice to counsel, have waived his rights under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments. It only held, as do we, that he did not."48 Thus,
unlike a suspect who invoked the court-created Miranda right to counsel,
police were in no way barred from initiating questioning with a
defendant represented by counsel pursuant to the express Sixth
Amendment right. So long as police obtained a voluntary and intelligent
waiver of the assistance of counsel, that waiver would be effective and
any statements by the defendant would be admissible.
The inconsistency between the Edwards-Minnick "waiver
invalidation" rule and the absence of such a rule applicable to the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel became the subject of a subsequent
Supreme Court decision: Michigan v. Jackson.49 In Jackson, the Court
considered the question of whether the logic of Edwards-Minnick is
equally applicable to the Sixth Amendment context; specifically, the
Court considered whether a defendant who requests appointment of
counsel thereby "invokes" his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
becomes "unapproachable" to police-initiated interrogation."o While the
Court acknowledged that the Edwards-Minnick rule was adopted to
enhance protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled
self-incrimination, it held that the logic of the rule necessitated
extending it to the Sixth Amendment context."' Specifically, the Court
noted that "[a]lthough the Edwards decision itself rested on the Fifth
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 202-03.
Id. at 206.
430 U.S. 387 (1977).
Id. at 387, 404-06.
Id. at 405-06.
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).
Id. at 626.
Id.
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Amendment and concerned a request for counsel made during custodial
interrogation, the Michigan Supreme Court correctly perceived that the
reasoning of that case applies with even greater force to these cases."52
But there was a material difference between the per se
Edwards-Minnick unapproachability/waiver invalidation rule and the
application of that same rule to the Sixth Amendment context: a clear
indication of invocation. In the Miranda context, the Edwards-Minnick
rule comes into force only when a suspect unambiguously invokes the
Miranda right to counsel.53 This invocation predicate leaves no doubt
that the suspect feels assistance of counsel is necessary to aid a decision
on whether to waive or invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and, if
waived, how to interact with police.54 In contrast, depending on
jurisdiction, a defendant may be assigned counsel without ever even
requesting that assistance."s Or even when requesting counsel, the
request is normally general in nature and not specifically related to a
perceived need for counsel during police questioning.
These contextual differences would ultimately lead to the demise of
Jackson, which was reversed by the Court when it decided Montejo.56 in
that case, petitioner Montejo, charged with murder, had been appointed
counsel at an automatic preliminary hearing without ever making a
request.57 On the same day that he was appointed counsel, but before
counsel met with Montejo, "two police detectives visited Montejo back
at the prison and requested that he accompany them on an excursion to
locate the murder weapon."" Montejo was read his Miranda rights
before agreeing to go with the police in search of the murder weapon. 9
"[D]uring the excursion, he wrote an inculpatory letter of apology to the
victim's widow." 60 The apology letter was admitted during the guilt
phase of Montejo's first-degree murder trial, and he was convicted and
sentenced to death.61 Montejo had not previously invoked his Miranda
right to counsel, so the Edwards-Minnickrule played no role in assessing
52. Id. at 636.
53. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) ("We further hold that an accused,
such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not
subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police.").
54. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994) ("If the suspect's statement is not
an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop
questioning him.").
55. See infra note 57 and accompanying text; infra note 62 and accompanying text.
56. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 797 (2009).
57. Id. at 781.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 782.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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the validity of the waiver.62 And, unlike Jackson, Montejo had never
even requested to be represented by counsel in the adversarial process
that had already begun." Nonetheless, Montejo argued the waiver was
invalid because police had violated Jackson by initiating the
interrogation after he was, in fact, represented by counsel.'
The Court began by laying out the disparity between jurisdictions
created by Jackson, and how that decision's unapproachability rule
turned on whether a defendant requested counsel or was appointed
counsel without request.65 In order to eliminate this disparity, the Court
chose not to extend the Jackson rule to defendants like Montejo, who
never actually requested counsel, but instead to overrule Jackson and
strip all defendants of a Sixth Amendment-based unapproachability
rule.66 In support of the decision, the majority asserted that the extension
of the Edwards-Minnick rule to the Sixth Amendment context had
always been dubious because the rule was created to protect suspects
from "badgering" in the context of custodial interrogation, and nothing
in Jackson suggested that police request for waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel implicated analogous concerns.6 Although
the dissent pointed out that this reasoning distorted the rationale of
Edwards-Minnick, which was, in fact, to ensure police do not exploit the
invocation of the need for an attorney's assistance when dealing with
police-a rationale that applied with equal logic to the Sixth
Amendment context 68-the majority's characterization doomed Jackson:
Which brings us to the strength of Jackson's reasoning. When this
Court creates a prophylactic rule in order to protect a constitutional
right, the relevant "reasoning" is the weighing of the rule's benefits
against its costs. "The value of any prophylactic rule . . . must be

assessed not only on the basis of what is gained, but also on the basis
of what is lost." We think that the marginal benefits of Jackson (viz.,
the number of confessions obtained coercively that are suppressed by
its bright-line rule and would otherwise have been admitted) are
dwarfed by its substantial costs (viz., hindering "society's compelling
interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law.").69

62. Id. at 789.
63. Id. at 782.
64. Id at 786.
65. Id. at 785.
66. Id at 797.
67. Id. at 787-88.
68. Id. at 805-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 793 (majority opinion) (internal citations omitted) (first quoting Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 161 (1990); and then quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426
(1986)).
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The majority also emphasized the extensive protection against
police badgering already afforded to defendants: first, the provision of
counsel to aid them in making intelligent waiver decisions,7 0 and second,
if subjected to custodial interrogation, the protection afforded by
Miranda and its progeny, including the Edwards-Minnick rule.71 Justice
Scalia characterized the limited added value of the Jackson rule, and the
package of protections available without it, as follows:
A bright-line rule like that adopted in Jackson ensures that no fruits of
interrogations made possible by badgering-induced involuntary
waivers are ever erroneously admitted at trial. But without Jackson,
how many would be? The answer is few if any. The principal reason is
that the Court has already taken substantial other, overlapping
measures toward the same end. Under Miranda's prophylactic
protection of the right against compelled self-incrimination, any
suspect subject to custodial interrogation has the right to have a lawyer
present if he so requests, and to be advised of that right. Under
Edwards' prophylactic protection of the Miranda right, once such a
defendant "has invoked his right to have counsel present,"
interrogation must stop. And under Minnick's prophylactic protection
of the Edwards right, no subsequent interrogation may take place until
counsel is present, "whether or not the accused has consulted with his
attorney." These three layers of prophylaxis are sufficient. Under the
Miranda-Edwards-Minnick line of cases (which is not in doubt), a
defendant who does not want to speak to the police without counsel
present need only say as much when he is first approached and given
72
the Miranda warnings.

By stripping defendants of a Sixth Amendment unapproachability
rule, Montejo opened the door for police to solicit and obtain waivers of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order to interrogate a
defendant. Of course, as the Court noted, if that interrogation were to
occur in the context of custodial interrogation, Miranda and its progeny
would provide a distinct source of protection, and any defendant who
invoked the Miranda right to counsel would be protected by the
Edwards-Minnick unapproachability rule. 73 Furthermore, the Court
emphasized that allowing police to initiate interrogation of a represented
defendant is only the first step in the admissibility analysis and that
ultimately the state would bear the burden of proving the defendant
made a voluntary and intelligent waiver.74 In essence, the Court merely
turned the clock back to Brewer v. Williams, where the Court rejected a
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 797-98.
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"

Sixth Amendment unapproachability rule but held instead that the police
detective failed to obtain a valid waiver.7
Perhaps this is why the Court emphasized that normally, the use of
a Miranda warning and waiver would satisfy the prosecution burden of
proving a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when
implicated by police interrogation.7 6 Specifically, the Court indicated:
Our precedents also place beyond doubt that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as
relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The
defendant may waive the right whether or not he is already represented
by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be counseled. And
when a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to
have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those
rights, that typically does the trick, even though the Miranda rights
purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment: As a general
matter . . an accused who is admonished with the warnings prescribed
by this Court in Miranda . . has been sufficiently apprised of the
nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of the consequences of
abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will be
77
considered a knowing and intelligent one.
In a situation where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has
attached and the defendant is subjected to custodial interrogation, use of
the Miranda waiver to prove waiver of both the Miranda right to counsel
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is logical. However, this
passage from the opinion also raises the possibility that police might use
a Miranda warning and waiver to establish waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel in situations where the defendant is not in
custody and therefore not actually entitled to Miranda protections.
The Court's suggestion to use a Miranda warning and waiver to
establish Sixth Amendment waiver raises an interesting question: what
would be the effect of invocation of the right to counsel in response to
such a warning? While this scenario might be relatively uncommon,
what is the broader question of the impact of a premature or unnecessary
Miranda warning? In Oregon v. Mathiason79 and Berkemer v.
McCarty,so the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of custody for

75. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
76. Montejo, 556 U.S. at 786-87.
77. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988)).
78. See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 182-83 (2013) (holding that a prosecutor's comment
on a defendant's silence during a non-custodial police interview did not violate the defendant's Fifth
Amendment due process rights because he did not specifically invoke the privilege).
79. 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
80. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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purposes of triggering Miranda protections." Those cases extended the
definition of custody beyond formal arrest or station-house detention to
include the functional equivalent of arrest: any deprivation of liberty that
would lead a reasonable person to believe they had been restrained to a
degree tantamount to formal arrest.82 Because of this, it is not
uncommon for police officers to provide Miranda warnings to a suspect
who has been detained in situations that, in hindsight, might not have
actually qualified as custody. Such practice is a logical response to
situations of "custody uncertainty": situations where the officer is unsure
whether the level of restraint imposed on the suspect will be determined
by a court to have qualified as Miranda custody.83 In short, there are
likely many situations where police utilize a prophylactic procedure of
providing a Miranda warning to offset any risk that a confession might
be vulnerable to Miranda-basedsuppression.
What is the effect of invocation of Miranda rights in response to
such a warning, whether in the Sixth Amendment context or the
uncertain custody context? Answering this question implicates two
considerations: first, the Court's approach to what might be called
"preemptive" invocations of constitutional rights; and second, the
totality analysis of what qualifies as Miranda custody. But before
addressing these considerations, why is this question even significant?
Certainly, if the suspect waives the Miranda rights and submits to
interrogation, the question of whether the warming was in fact required is
irrelevant, and the warning and waiver would almost certainly nullify
any claim of actual coercion in violation of due process. And, as
Montejo emphasized, such a waiver would also satisfy the requirement
to prove waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when
implicated. 84
But what would be the outcome of invocation of the Miranda right
to counsel? In the Sixth Amendment context, the answer seems clear:
81. Id. at 440, 442 (holding that the standard for custody is whether a reasonable person
would feel free to leave, and that a Terry stop does not necessarily equate to custody); Mathiason,
429 U.S. at 495 (holding that parolee who voluntarily came to police station was not in custody).
82. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1983)) ("It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a
suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with a formal arrest."'); Mathiason,
429 U.S. at 495 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)) (holding it was "clear" that
suspect who "came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he
was not under arrest," "was not in custody 'or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way').
83. See, e.g., Christopher L. McFarlin, Back 2 Basics: When Must Police Give Miranda
Warnings?, IN PUB. SAFETY (Nov. 27, 2017), https://inpublicsafety.com/2017/11/back-2-basicswhen-must-police-give-miranda-warnings (suggesting, through officer training material, that
"Miranda advisements don't cost anything but your time. If you are unsure about whether they are
necessary or not, play it safe and either stop asking questions or give the warnings!").
84. See supra text accompanying note 76.
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subsequent interrogation would violate the right." The Miranda context
seems more complicated. Would an individual who was not actually in
custody then be able to seek exclusion of any statement based upon
invocation of Miranda rights provided as a prophylactic measure in
response to the uncertainty as to custody? And in either context, the
invocation would raise the difficult question of whether the defendant
was then protected by the Edwards-Minnick rule. Would a subsequent
waiver of either the Miranda right to counsel or the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel be treated as invalid if obtained as the result of police
reinitiation within fourteen days of the initial invocation? If treated as a
preemptive or premature invocation of the Miranda right to counsel, the
answer should be no. But perhaps the use of the Miranda warning should
itself be treated as an indication that the individual was in custody for
purposes of Miranda.86
B.

McNeil v. Wisconsin and the Invalidity ofPreemptive Miranda
Invocations

In McNeil, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel implicitly invoked
the Miranda right to counsel." McNeil was decided after Jackson, but
before Jackson was overruled by Montejo. Paul McNeil sought to
suppress a statement he made implicating himself in a murder in
Caledonia, Racine County, Wisconsin, during an interview police
initiated after he had been appointed a public defender for an armed
robbery in West Allis, Milwaukee County, Wisconsin." McNeil was
arrested in Omaha, Nebraska in May 1987 on a warrant charging him
with the West Allis robbery.89 While McNeil was still in Omaha,
deputies from the Milwaukee County Sheriffs Office attempted to
question him regarding the robbery. 90 Upon hearing his Miranda rights,
McNeil exercised his right to remain silent, but did not specifically
request counsel.91 After being transported back to Milwaukee County,

85. See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 179 (1991).
86. See generally Ann F. Walsh, Should Unnecessary Warnings Wrap a Suspect in the
Panoply of Miranda Protections?, 10 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADvoc. 135 (2005) (examining the
implications of police provision of Miranda rights to defendants in situations in which they may
prove obsolete).
87. McNeil, 501 U.S. at 173.
88. Id. at 173-74.
89. Id. at 173.
90. Id.
91. See id. ("He refused to answer any questions, but did not request an attorney."). But see
Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 186-87 (2013) ("Our cases establish that a defendant normally does
not invoke the privilege by remaining silent.. . .A witness does not expressly invoke the privilege
by standing mute.").
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McNeil was appointed a public defender, who represented McNeil at his
initial appearance on the robbery charge. 92
After his bail hearing, McNeil was approached by a detective who
was investigating a murder and related offenses in Caledonia. 93 The
investigator read McNeil his Miranda rights and McNeil signed a written
waiver.94 McNeil "did not deny knowledge of the Caledonia crimes, but
said that he had not been involved." 95 The detective returned and
reinitiated interrogation regarding the Caledonia crimes two days later,
and during the second interview, McNeil admitted he was involved in
the murder in Caledonia along with two accomplices. 96 Police
interrogated McNeil a third time before he was "formally charged with
the Caledonia crimes and transferred to that jurisdiction." 97 Before each
interview, police read McNeil his Miranda rights and each time McNeil
initialed and signed written waivers. 98 McNeil sought to suppress his
statements to police regarding the Caledonia murder because police had
initiated interrogation after he was represented by counsel on the robbery
charge. 99
Thus, the issue in McNeil is whether an accused represented by
counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment is unapproachable so that
even apparently voluntary waivers are per se invalid if counsel is not
present. The Court acknowledged that Jackson would require
invalidation of any ostensible waiver of McNeil's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 1 o However, the confession McNeil sought to suppress
was unrelated to the robbery charge for which he had been appointed
counsel in another county.10 Accordingly, based on the established rule
that the Sixth Amendment protection is offense-specific-that it does
not protect a defendant from questioning about an unrelated offenseMcNeil had no basis to assert a violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 102 McNeil argued that the waivers obtained by police were all
invalid pursuant to the Edwards-Minnick rule.1 03 McNeil asserted that
when he was appointed counsel at his initial appearance, that
appointment implicitly invoked his Miranda right to counsel, thereby

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

McNeil, 501 U.S. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173-74.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 175-76.
Id.
Id. at 177.
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implicating the Edwards-Minnick rule." The government responded
that the Edwards-Minnick rule was inapplicable to assessing the validity
of these waivers because McNeil had never invoked his Miranda right to
counsel. 0 5
The Court rejected McNeil's assertion of implied invocation of
Miranda rights, emphasizing that the interests implicated by an
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel are different from
those implicated by invocation of the Miranda right to counsel.1 06 As the
Court said:
To invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact, not to
invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest. One might be quite willing to
speak to the police without counsel present concerning many matters,
but not the matter under prosecution. It can be said, perhaps, that it is
likely that one who has asked for counsel's assistance in defending
against a prosecution would want counsel present for all custodial
interrogation, even interrogation unrelated to the charge. That is not
necessarily true, since suspects often believe that they can avoid the
laying of charges by demonstrating an assurance of innocence through
frank and unassisted answers to questions. But even if it were true, the
likelihood that a suspect would wish counsel to be present is not the
test for applicability of Edwards. The rule of that case applies only
when the suspect "ha[s] expressed" his wish for the particular sort of
lawyerly assistance that is the subject of Miranda. It requires, at a
minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an
expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney in dealing with
custodial interrogation by the police. Requesting the assistance of an
07
attorney at a bail hearing does not bear that construction.

This difference led the Court to reject the notion of an implied
Miranda invocation. The Court bolstered the rationale for this rejection
by emphasizing that the opportunity to invoke the Miranda right to
counsel, when advised of that right, was fully sufficient to protect a
suspect who was represented by counsel on one offense:
If a suspect does not wish to communicate with the police except
through an attorney, he can simply tell them that when they give him
the Miranda warnings. There is not the remotest chance that he will
feel "badgered" by their asking to talk to him without counsel present,
since the subject will not be the charge on which he has already
requested counsel's assistance (for in that event Jackson would
preclude initiation of the interview) and he will not have rejected
uncounseled interrogation on any subject before (for in that event
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 178.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981)).
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Edwards would preclude initiation of the interview). The proposed rule
law
effective
impede
however,
seriously
would,
enforcement.. . . Thus, if we were to adopt petitioner's rule, most
persons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be
unapproachableby police officers suspecting them of involvement in
other crimes, even though they have never expressed any unwillingness
to be questioned. Since the ready ability to obtain uncoerced
confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good, society would be
the loser.

08

This rejection then led the dissent to predict that a defendant
making his or her first appearance, knowing that the request for or
appointment of counsel is no shield to police-initiated interrogation on
other offenses, would simply announce invocation of the Miranda right
to counsel to gain the benefit of the Edwards-Minnick rule.1 09
The majority response, provided in footnote three of the opinion,
indicated it highly unlikely that invocation of Miranda protections would
be recognized as valid prior to the Miranda right being triggered by
custodial interrogation:
The dissent predicts that the result in this case will routinely be
circumvented when, "[i]n future preliminary hearings, competent
counsel ... make sure that they, or their clients, make a statement on
the record" invoking the Miranda right to counsel. We have in fact
never held that a person can invoke his Miranda rights anticipatorily,
in a context other than "custodial interrogation"-which a preliminary
hearing will not always, or even usually, involve. If the Miranda right
to counsel can be invoked at a preliminary hearing, it could be argued,
there is no logical reason why it could not be invoked by a letter prior
to arrest, or indeed even prior to identification as a suspect. Most rights
must be asserted when the government seeks to take the action they
protect against. The fact that we have allowed the Miranda right to
counsel, once asserted, to be effective with respect to future custodial
interrogation does not necessarily mean that we will allow it to be
asserted initially outside the context of custodial interrogation, with
similar future effect. Assuming, however, that an assertion at
arraignment would be effective, and would be routinely made, the
mere fact that adherence to the principle of our decisions will not have
substantial consequences is no reason to abandon that principle. It
would remain intolerable that a person in custody who had expressed
no objection to being questioned would be unapproachable. 0
This footnote indicates that an anticipatory invocation of Miranda
rights has no impact on whether that invocation has any actual effect.
108. Id. at 180-81.
109. Id. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 182 n.3 (majority opinion).
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"

However, it seems equally clear that the Court was significantly
influenced by the fact that neither police nor the Court had done
anything to indicate to McNeil that he was in a situation subject to the
Miranda warning and waiver requirement. Perhaps even more significant
was that by rejecting the notion of an implied invocation of the Miranda
right to counsel resulting from request for or appointment of counsel at
McNeil's first appearance, the Court concluded that McNeil had done
nothing to indicate a need for assistance of counsel during police
interrogation.11
If, however, police were to follow the suggestion in Montejo that
use of a Miranda warning and waiver normally "does the trick" to prove
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the context of
anticipatory invocation would be very different than that in McNeil. In
that situation, an individual who requests a lawyer following the warning
would have indicated, unlike McNeil, a desire to be assisted by counsel
during interrogation. Nonetheless, unless the individual were actually in
custody at that time, he or she would be invoking a right that was not yet
applicable. Would the Edwards-Minnick rule prohibit police from
reinitiating contact with the individual within the Shatzer fourteen-day
unapproachability timeframe? If so, the significance of the Montejo
decision to overrule Jackson would be somewhat nullified as any
statement obtained after police reinitiation would run afoul of the
Miranda-basedEdwards-Minnick rule even if a waiver were considered
valid for Sixth Amendment purposes. Or would the absence of custody
nullify any claim to the protection of Miranda and its unapproachability
progeny?
While McNeil rejected the validity of an anticipatory Miranda
invocation, it seems equally invalid to inform an individual of a "right"
to assistance of counsel but then deny the benefit of invoking that right
because the warning was not legally required. The direct consequence of
ignoring such an invocation would be interrogation of the individual
immediately following the invocation. This seems highly unlikely as the
police officer would almost certainly terminate the interrogation based
on the invocation. In the context of attempting to establish proof of
waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the "invocation" by the
defendant in response to a Miranda warning would render the outcome
of any questioning inadmissible as there would be no evidence of
waiver. In the context of a police officer using a Miranda warning
prophylactically in a situation of custody uncertainty, it is less certain
that any statement would be inadmissible if the suspect invoked
111. See id. at 178, 180-82 ("To invoke the Sixth Amendment interest is, as a matter of fact,
not to invoke the Miranda-Edwards interest. One might be quite willing to speak to the police
without counsel present concerning many matters, but not the matter under prosecution.").
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following the warning. But how likely would it be that the officer who
issued the warning would ignore the invocation and question the suspect
nonetheless? Probably not very likely.112
The more difficult question is whether a Miranda invocation in a
situation where Miranda protection is not legally applicable due to the
absence of custody should render the suspect unapproachable pursuant
to Edwards-Minnick. There are several ways this issue could logically be
addressed.
One approach could be to treat the Miranda warning as dispositive
proof of custody. Doing so would eliminate all uncertainty as to the
effect of an invocation, as treating the situation as custody would bring
the Miranda rule into force. But such an approach is fundamentally
inconsistent with the Court's definition of Miranda custody and its focus
on whether a reasonable person in the suspect's situation would believe
he was restrained to a degree tantamount to formal arrest. Being
provided a Miranda warning may be a factor in that assessment, but it is
hard to imagine how it could ever be dispositive. First, short of formal
arrest, no single factor is dispositive; the test is inherently one based on
the totality of the circumstances.113 Second, if used to prove waiver of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, there will be many situations
where no other objective indicia of custody will be present. Indeed, the
issue presented herein assumes a Miranda warning in situations where
custody would not be established pursuant to established jurisprudence.
An alternate approach would be to treat the Miranda warning as
purely gratuitous with no legal impact derived from the Miranda
decision and its progeny. This does not mean that an invocation would
have no legal significance, but rather that significance would derive
from the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination itself,
and not the Miranda rule. Like any other context, indicating a desire to
remain silent would qualify as an invocation of the constitutional
privilege. But unlike an invocation of Miranda rights, this invocation
would not carry with it the derivative protection against police
reinitiation of questioning at a later time. Because of the absence of
Miranda custody, such an invocation, in accordance with McNeil, would
not indicate the suspect felt a need for assistance of counsel in the
112. For a discussion of the interests in tension involved in police questions, see Anna
Strandberg, Asking for It: Silence and Invoking the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination After Salinas v. Texas, 8 CHARLESTON L. REv. 591, 596 (2014) (proposing that
two modifications be made to Fifth Amendment privilege analysis: "First, the inherent protections
stemming directly from the Fifth Amendment itself should be recognized as distinct from the
procedural safeguards imposed by either Miranda or the Due Process Clause. Second, for the
purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, a defendant's silence in the face of accusation should be
treated as distinct from an express admission.").
113. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1124-25 (1983).
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presumptively coercive environment of custodial interrogation. The
absence of that presumptive coercion would accordingly mean that any
subsequent decision to submit to police questioning, even if initiated by
police, need not be treated as presumptively invalid.
This latter approach seems best aligned with existing jurisprudence.
It also seems logical where the individual provided a premature or
unnecessary Miranda warning invoking the right to remain silent. That
invocation outside the context of custody would function no differently
than any other non-custodial invocation of the right to silence: it would
require termination of questioning but would have no other lingering
effect on subsequent questioning efforts. What seems more complicated
is the non-custodial suspect who seeks to invoke the Miranda right to
counsel in response to a premature non-custodial Miranda warning. It is
difficult to see how this should not be viewed as an expression of desire
to deal with police interrogation only with the assistance of counsel. As
a result, the invocation would implicate the Edwards-Minnick concerns
that the McNeil Court concluded were not implicated by a general
request for counsel at a first appearance.
Accordingly, a third approach might be to focus on the specific
nature of the premature warning invocation. If that invocation
specifically relates to the Miranda right to counsel, an equitable
extension of the Edwards-Minnick protection might be warranted. Of
course, such an approach is swimming up a proverbial stream against the
powerful currents of Jackson and McNeil. But if the rationale of McNeil
deprives a defendant of the benefit of a premature Miranda invocation
because the "general" request for representation indicates that the
specific interests of Miranda were not implicated, it is at least plausible
that where they are implicated-specifically as the result of police action
that indicates they are applicable-such an equitable extension would at
least be aligned with this jurisprudence.
III.

CONCLUSION

There may be an easy answer to the question of a premature
Miranda invocation presented in this Article: Miranda protections are
simply inapplicable until they are triggered by custodial interrogation.
But when an individual asserts Miranda rights after being informed of
those rights by police, the fact that the warning was unnecessary seems
to be an odd justification for allowing police to ignore the consequences
of that invocation.
One solution to the disconnect between what the officer advised in
the way of informing the individual and the actual impact of that advice
would be to simply treat the invocation like any other pre-custodial
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invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege: it would prohibit
questioning but would in no way prohibit police reinitiation of
questioning. However, where the individual specifically invokes the
Miranda right to counsel in response to a Miranda warning, this seems
like an incomplete solution, as the invocation indicates the individual's
desire to deal with police only through counsel. This solution seems
even more problematic when the reinitiation occurs outside the context
of custody and therefore need not involve another Miranda warning.
Thus, in response to the premature Miranda warning, the individual
would have indicated the desire for assistance of counsel, but when
police subsequently reinitiate questioning, the individual would not then
again be advised of the right to that assistance.
The other solution would be to treat the Miranda warning itself as
sufficient to bring the protections of the Miranda rule into force-to
include the unapproachability protection provided by Edwards and
Minnick. While this is undoubtedly an extension of the
Edwards-Minnickrule, which will be viewed by many as an unnecessary
extension of a prophylactic rule that has been criticized even when
triggered by custodial interrogation,1 14 it would produce a more equitable
alignment between the individual's expectations and the consequences
of invoking a right based on a premature advisement.
A third solution could be to develop a warning and waiver
specifically tailored to the Sixth Amendment for use in situations where
police sought to initiate interrogation of an individual protected by the
Sixth Amendment in a non-custodial setting. Use of the Miranda
warning and waiver will serve the dual-purpose of proving waiver of
both the Miranda and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when the
individual is subjected to custodial interrogation. Indeed, in that
situation, the Miranda waiver will indeed "do the trick." But the "trick"
will be on the individual subjected to questioning when police use the
Miranda warning in the non-custodial setting precisely because the
warning is not properly tailored to the right implicated by the
questioning. Using a warning and waiver specifically focused on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in situations where police sought to
initiate interrogation of an individual protected by the Sixth Amendment
in a non-custodial setting will avoid creating a false expectation of
protection derived from the Miranda rule. Waiver will allow
questioning; invocation will require police to terminate questioning. But
invocation after a specific Sixth Amendment warning will not render the
individual unapproachable by police who seek to reinitiate at a later date.

114. See supratext accompanying note 67.
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This Sixth Amendment waiver approach is not a complete answer
to the premature Miranda warning question, as it in no way addresses the
premature warning unrelated to an effort to secure a waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, but it will at least fill a potential gap of
uncertainty created by Montejo's suggestion to use a Miranda warning
and waiver to secure waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
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